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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education,'
striking down state laws that sanctioned racial segregation of public
schools, marked the dawning of the modern civil rights era. All of the
cases, laws and policies mandating equal treatment and opportunity that
followed are traceable in one way or another to Brown; they stand in
stark contrast to the policies of governmentally fostered or tolerated racial
separation and inequality that preceded.
A full generation has passed since Brown; black and white children
born in 1954 are now adults, mainy with children of their own. Sufficient
time has elapsed to permit us to examine retrospectively the effectiveness
of Brown, the current vitality of its principles, and its continuing rele-
vance to people whose lives seem far removed from the revolution in civil
rights that Brown ignited.
Any fair assessment yields a mass of contradictions. For some who were
meant to be the beneficiaries of the new civil rights policies, there has
been increased affluence, while for others there has been deepened misery.
For the country as a whole, there have been major changes in behavior
and attitudes accompanied by persistent prejudice. The story has been one
of both striking success and abject failure. In some ways, the children of
the 1980's are growing up in a society not very different from the one
their parents confronted three decades ago. Racial isolation, division and
tension persist. A wide gulf still separates the life opportunities of most
black and white children, and there still exists little consensus as to the
measures appropriate or effective for dealing with the legacy of
discrimination.
t B.A. Brooklyn College, LL.B. Yale Law School. The author, a Washington, D.C. attorney who
specializes in civil rights, previously served as a staff attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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A. Brown and the Caste System
Despite the continued existence of racial inequality, a fundamental dif-
ference between the 1950's and the 1980's should not be obscured: The
official caste system that held sway for more than two centuries prior to
Brown has been eliminated. Under that system, black people were treated
as an inferior class, experiencing daily indignities solely because of their
race. Blacks were segregated in all public institutions, provided inferior
public services of all sorts, and widely denied the right to vote. They were
relegated to the back of the bus, refused food and lodging at restaurants
and hotels almost everywhere, addressed by their first names in govern-
ment offices and court proceedings, denied common courtesies, and
threatened with physical and economic repercussions if they stepped out of
line. While this system of subjugation was legalized and all-encompassing
primarily in the Southern states, much of it existed at least unofficially in
the North and West as well.
Today that official caste system is gone. Black people who have the
economic means can, for the most part, move with confidence in everyday
society-in restaurants, hotels, theatres, public beaches and tennis courts.
And, whatever their socio-economic status, blacks can generally expect
civil and even-handed treatment at the polls, at the courthouse, on buses
and at other public facilities. They command the respect denied to them in
the past because they have demanded and won it through their battles
fought in the courtroom and the streets.
In important measure these changes in the public face of America re-
flect the political power achieved by black people. The Brown decision
rekindled their hopes and gave new energy to the organizations that re-
present them. When our national leaders did not enforce Brown, hope and
anger combined to fuel the direct action protest movement led by Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. That movement became the catalyst for the
breakthroughs of the 1960's, including a law that finally provided an ef-
fective means for ending racial disenfranchisement. With the passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the energies of the protest movement
turned to the political organization necessary to take full advantage of the
remedies the law provided.
So, in Birmingham, where Commissioner Bull Connor once set hoses
and police dogs on Dr. King and his adherents, a black mayor now pre-
sides. In the state capitol, a governor whose "segregation forever" speeches
once provided the model for racist politicians now clings to power by mak-
ing promises to blacks. In Washington, Senators Strom Thurmond (R-
South Carolina) and John Stennis (D-Mississippi), once champions of the
old order, cast reluctant votes in 1982 for an extension and strengthening
of the Voting Rights Act, a silent tribute to the effectiveness of the 1965
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law in compelling attention to the needs of black constituents. The change
in the public face of the nation also stems in part from a recognition of the
foothold that black people collectively have gained in the economy. Black
faces in television commercials and in front offices of major companies
testify to the business creed that no segment of the market place should be
neglected.
Yet the explanation for the disappearance of outward manifestations of
the old caste system goes beyond the pull of political and economic self-
interest. Experience has proven President Eisenhower wrong in his
Sumnerian view that law (specifically the Brown decision) would not
change the "hearts and minds" of men.2 Law, once it was enforced, did
change behavior patterns and eventually the attitudes that underlay them.
This change is evidenced by the strategies employed by the Reagan Ad-
ministration, which, in its attempts to undo many of the remedies for dis-
crimination that have been forged over the past two decades, does not
make its appeal using the old code words. Instead, it seeks to persuade the
public that it desires to be fair to all and that its policies are consistent
with the quest for a "color blind" society of such heroes of the civil rights
movement as King, Roy Wilkins, and Thurgood Marshall. More impor-
tant, the strong resistance that the Administration has encountered to its
proposals, from, for example, school boards solicited to join in efforts to
end busing for desegregation and employers encouraged to abandon af-
firmative action, suggests the durability of the institutional and attitudinal
changes that have occurred since Brown. Whether or not people are ready
to extend the gains made in racial justice, there is little evidence of a
nostalgia for the "good old days" of enforced segregation.
These differences in the race relations of the 1950's and 1980's might
not have required such lengthy explication were it not for the lack of
historical perspective that seems to be an American trait and the current
conventional wisdom that governmental efforts to solve social problems are
doomed to failure. There is a tendency, particularly on the part of people
under the age of thirty-five, to view the pre-Brown regime of "separate
but equal" as a foible, easily dispensed with once people focused on its
irrationality. Few recognize how deeply entrenched were the roots of the
system, not just in economic but in emotional terms, and at what cost in
blood and effort the elimination of the old order was purchased. A deeper
historical perspective, by demonstrating how far-reaching were the effects
of this caste system and what eradicating still existing effects would re-
quire, might make people more pessimistic about the possibility of elimi-
2. Eisenhower said in 1958 that "laws themselves will never solve problems that have their roots
in the human heart and in human emotions." Quoted in R. SARRATT, THE ORDEAL OF SEGREGA-
TION 51 (1966).
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nating racism. Yet it might also encourage the belief that even seemingly
intractable problems can yield to citizen action through government.
B. Brown and Equal Opportunity
There was more to Brown than just removing the stain of white
supremacy from the nation's lawbooks and its public dealings. Under-
girding the decision lay a belief that government has an affirmative obliga-
tion to remove barriers that deprive citizens of an equal opportunity to
succeed. The Court wrote:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It
is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made availa-
ble to all on equal terms.3
An opportunity "to succeed in life." Not a guarantee of success, but not
merely a formalistic concession either. Rather, a genuine chance to de-
velop one's skills and to reap the rewards of using those skills. Just below
the surface of the Brown decision was the belief that segregation laws
were not only devices for isolating and humiliating black people, but also
shackles that restrained them from moving as far as their abilities would
carry them.
If, in the words of Charles Black, segregation was a "massive inten-
tional disadvantaging of the Negro race"4 by state law, then it is not un-
reasonable to ask three decades after Brown whether the disadvantage has
been eliminated or substantially reduced. To the extent that the economic
and education gap between blacks and whites has narrowed, one may in-
quire, within the limits of imperfect knowledge, whether the Brown deci-
sion and the laws and policies that followed contributed significantly to
black progress. To the extent that the conditions of some black people
have not improved or even have worsened, it is legitimate to ask whether
the Justices in Brown were wrong in concluding that segregation inhibited
black children from acquiring knowledge and skills that would enable
3. 347 U.S. at 493.
4. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 421 (1960).
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them to succeed in life. Alternatively, continuing conditions of deprivation
for black people may be accounted for by a failure to break down racial
segregation through enforcement of the Constitution and civil rights laws.
Or it may be that although the elimination of racial isolation is an impor-
tant avenue or even a necessary condition to educational and economic
advancement, it is not a sufficient condition. Other measures of a public
or private character may be needed to establish genuine opportunity.
All of these matters are subject to heated controversy among social
scientists who debate the diverse policy prescriptions of contending politi-
cal ideologies and the nexus between laws and policies and particular out-
comes. It is not my intent in this essay to enter into a full scale examina-
tion of the relationship between rights, laws and policies and current
socioeconomic conditions, but rather to identify a few links that seem rea-
sonably well established.
Such an inquiry may provide useful background material in reviewing:
(1) the soundness of remedial principles that have been employed by the
courts since Brown and their continuing efficacy in providing opportuni-
ties for low-income black people and (2) the applicability of equal protec-
tion principles to people whose isolation today may stem as much from
their condition of poverty as from their race.
II. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE SINCE BROWN
A. Black Gains: 1954-1984
By familiar and accepted gauges, a significant segment of the black
population, particularly people who have come to maturity in the post-
Brown era, has made striking progress. One key measure of this progress
is the movement of black workers from menial and low-paying jobs into
more skilled and remunerative occupations. From 1961 to 1982, the pro-
portion of black people in the labor force in professional and technical
jobs increased from 4.6 percent to almost 10 percent.5 In executive, mana-
gerial and administrative jobs, the rise was from 2.5 percent to more than
5 percent.6 Although these changes reflect in part a general upgrading of
the occupational status of the labor force, gains for white workers during
5. The current figures appear in CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, A DREAM DE-
FERRED: THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACK AMERICANS 22 (1983) [hereinafter cited as DREAM
DEFERRED], and in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICA'S BLACK POPULATION, 1970-82, at 11
(1983). Although both are based on census data there are some slight variations in the figures in the
two reports. The statistics for earlier years are reported in Malveaux, Shifts in the Employment and
Occupational Status of Black Americans in a Period of Affirmative Action, in WORKING PAPERS:
BAKKE, WEBER AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, table 5, at 148 (1979) [hereinafter cited as WORKING
PAPERS].
6. Malveaux, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 5, table 5, at 148.
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the same period were significantly more modest.' When attention is di-
rected to the younger minority groups in the population, even more en-
couraging indications of mobility emerge. As recently as 1968, only 12.4
percent of all black women in the 25-34 age category were employed in
professional jobs. By 1977, the proportion for the same group (by then the
35-44 age category) had increased to 18.8 percent.'
The movement of black people into the professions and other high sta-
tus occupations is reflected in substantial income gains. In 1981, almost
one quarter of all black families had incomes of more than $25,000, com-
pared to only 8.7 percent in 1960 (measuring income in constant dollars).9
Although the income gap between blacks and whites for the entire popu-
lation has not narrowed over the past two decades, for those subgroups
who have gained some occupational mobility it has closed appreciably.
Thus, when considering families where there are two wage earners, black
income as a percentage of white income rose from 73 percent in 1968 to
84 percent in 1981.10 For younger and more educated blacks, the income
gap has closed even more significantly. In 1976 blacks in the 25-29 age
group who were college graduates earned 93 percent as much as their
white counterparts, a gain of about 12 percent in 7 years.11
The improved occupational status and growing income of a segment of
the black population reflect important changes in educational attainment.
As recently as 1966, the number of black students attending college was
only 340,000. By 1974, black enrollment had risen to 814,000, and by
1982 it had reached more than one million.12 By 1980, 80 percent of black
students attended predominantly white institutions, a dramatic shift from
the rigidly segregated character of higher education in the past. Changes
in expectations and prospects for minorities are suggested by the rise in
the proportion of black students majoring in business from 5 percent in
1966 to 18 percent, while concentration in occupations traditionally re-
served for blacks declined.1
Significant change has also occurred in the enrollment of blacks in pro-
fessional schools, particularly in medical and law schools. Law school en-
7. Comparing the Malveaux statistics, id., to the Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports for May, 1982, the figures for whites went from 12.3 percent to 17.3 percent over a 20 year
period in the professions and from 11.6 percent to 12.2 percent in managerial and administrative jobs.
8. Malveaux, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 5, at 153. For black women in the 25-34 age
category in 1977, the proportion was 18.6 percent.
9. DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 5, at 6.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Myth or Reality?, in THE DECLINING SIGNIFI-
CANCE OF RACE?: A DIALOGUE AMONG BLACK AND WHITE SOCIAL ScIENTissI 6-7 (Washington
ed. 1979).
12. Id. at 8.
13. Id. at 7. The proportion of black education majors dropped from 45 to 26 percent in the same
period.
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rollment rose from 3 percent in 1969 to 4.2 percent in 1979 and 4.7 per-
cent in 1982.14 Medical schools, many of which excluded black students
until after World War II, had only a 2.6 percent black enrollment in
1969. By 1977, black enrollment had risen to 6 percent. 5 The magnitude
of the change is illustrated by the fact that 3,000 black students were
enrolled in medical schools in 1974 at a time when there were only 6,000
black physicians in the nation.
Studies show that significant numbers of advanced black students come
from families of lower income and job status." This indicates that large
enrollments reflect increased mobility, not simply changing occupational
preferences among middle class families. The striking gains in higher and
professional education are evidence that improvements in the economic
and occupational status of blacks are products of their own efforts to ac-
quire education and skills and to break down discrimination barriers, not
of preferential treatment by government. Further refutation of claims that
advances are not based on merit may be found in the improved perform-
ance of black students on tests that are widely used as measures of educa-
tional ability. At a time of general concern about stagnation and decline in
achievement of public school students, the National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress reported gains in cognitive skills by black students. Be-
tween 1970 and 1980, the greatest gains in reading skills among nine-
year-old children, black or white, were made by black students, students
who live in the Southeast, and students who attend school in either rural
communities or disadvantaged urban communities. 17 Although maintain-
ing educational progress through high school has often proved difficult,
the generation of black students who came through school in the 1970's
14. Statistics are drawn from figures cited by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in Toward
Equal Opportunity: Affirmative Admissions Programs at Law and Medical Schools 73-75 (June
1978) and in Statement of Affirmative Action 10-11 (1977), and from the Department of Education's
Higher Education General Information Survey. The 1982 data were supplied by the Office for Civil
Rights of the U.S. Department of Education to the Center for National Policy Review. Since law
school enrollment burgeoned during the 1970's, the numerical increase in minority students is even
more noteworthy. In 1969 there were only 2,128 black students enrolled in approved law schools. By
1979 there were 5,257 blacks. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A REvIEW OF LEGAL EDUCA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 60, 63 (1979).
15. See 51 JOURNAL OF MEDICAL EDUCATION 1042 (1980); N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, at 67,
col. 5.
16. See Alexis, The Effect of Admission Procedures on Minority Enrollment in Graduate and
Professional Schools, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 5, at 52, 59-60. Alexis reports that of the
class that entered medical school in 1976-77, nearly half of the black students came from families
whose incomes were less than $10,000. Only 11.6 percent of the white students fell into this category.
More than twice as many white students as black students had fathers who had completed college.
17. NATIONAl. ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS, THREE NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS OF
PROGRESS IN READING PERFORMANCE, 1970c 1980 (Rep. No. 11-R-01, Apr. 1981). In addition, the
only significant overall gain among the reporting group of 13-year-olds occurred for black students.
Id. at xiii.
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also has managed to narrow the black-white gap on college entrance
examinations. 8
Those blacks who have broken through in the past two decades to bet-
ter education, more skilled jobs, and higher pay have been rewarded with
middle-class status. They are far more likely than blacks in the past to
own their own homes, be part of families that never suffer the tragedy of
infant death,' and live long enough to become senior citizens.20 In sum,
for a substantial segment of the black population, the post-Brown era has
meant more than the elimination of official racism-it has brought genu-
ine opportunity. The status of some may not be secure and there are often
galling reminders of prejudice, but many blacks have joined the main-
stream. Although the ranks of the black middle class remain small com-
pared to whites, the story of the past two decades is one of individual and
collective progress exceeding that made by blacks in any other period in
American history.
B. Failure: 1954-1984
If the past three decades have brought genuine access to opportunity for
many black people, even more find their situation unchanged or even
worsened. The statistical evidence for this conclusion is by now depress-
ingly familiar. For almost all of the period from 1954 to 1984, in good
economic times and bad, the unemployment rate for blacks has been ap-
proximately double that for whites. During 1983, when white unemploy-
ment reached 10 percent, black unemployment was more than 20 percent,
the highest point it had reached in the three decades since Brown. In part,
this worsening situation reflects the failure of the economy and of national
policy to produce jobs for a growing black population. During the period
from 1960 to 1982, the black male population over the age of 16 almost
doubled from 5.6 million to 10.73 million. 1 But the number of employed
black men increased only from 4.15 million to 5.94 million, adding 3.4
million black men to the ranks of the unemployed.2 2 As a result, the pro-
18. Wash. Post, Aug. 31, 1983, at A6, col. 2.
19. Black infant deaths, which numbered 44.3 for every thousand live births in 1960, decreased to
21.8 per thousand in 1979. White infant deaths were 11.4 per thousand in 1979. DREAM DEFERRED,
supra note 5, at 47.
20. The life expectancy of black males at birth was 65.5 years in 1979, an increase of more than
four years since 1960, and 74.2 years for black females, an increase of almost eight years since 1960.
Life expectancy for white males and females in 1979 was more than four years longer than their
black counterparts. Id. at 48.
21. DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 5, at 20. Despite the fact that the unemployment rate for
black teenagers is often more than 50 percent, they accounted for only a small portion of the 3.4
million unemployed black males.
22. Id.
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.portion of black males over the age of 16 who were employed dropped
from 74 percent in 1960 to 55 percent in 1982.23
One major consequence of the crisis in black unemployment is the per-
sistence of a wide gap between black and white family incomes. In 1981
the median income of black families was 56 percent of that of white fami-
lies, scarcely improved from the 55 percent ratio that existed in 1960.24
Real income for black families rose during that time from a median of
$9,919 to $13,266, but, as indicated above, the gains were reaped largely
by some subgroups (e.g., younger, two-income families) while others, both
working and unemployed, were left mired in poverty.
The human impact of joblessness and low income may be assessed in
various ways, but one important gauge is its impact on children. In 1959,
two of every three black children under the age of 18 were growing up in
poverty. In 1981, 45 percent of all black children under the age of 18 still
were living in poverty;25 in 1985 the figure had risen to 48 percent.
26
Although the change from the 1950's indicates some progress, the fact that
in the 1980's almost half of all black children, compared to 14.7 percent of
white children,2 7 grow up in impoverished circumstances is striking com-
mentary on the status of the quest for access to opportunity.
Moreover, in recent years changes in the characteristics of poverty place
additional barriers in the way of poor black children. In the 1950's and
60's, although many black children were born into poverty, they were
usually raised in households where both parents were present. By 1981,
47 percent of all the black families in the nation were headed by women
who were responsible for raising children without the presence of a
spouse.28 A very high proportion of these families were poor. Indeed, in
female-headed black families two of every three children under the age of
18 and three of every four under the age of six live below the poverty
level.29 All told, about three million of the nine million black children in
the nation are growing up in impoverished, single-parent households, with
mothers who are responsible for raising them and bringing income into
the home.3"
23. N. Y. Times, July 18, 1983, at A8, col. 1.
24. DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 5, at 4. In contrast, a recent study by the Rand Corporation
indicates that among working men, the ratio of black male wages to white male wages reached 72.6%
in 1980. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1986, at E8, col. 1.
25. DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 5, at 25-27.
26. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
27. DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 5, at 25.
28. Id. at 29. By 1985, the figure reportedly had reached 50 percent. Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1986,
at Al, col. 1.
29. DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 5, at 26.
30. Id. Although the breakup of families is a phenomenon that affects all races, it is striking that
only three million of the more than 50 million white children in the country live in female-headed
households that are poor. Id.
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In addition, large numbers of poor black children are tightly concen-
trated in the poverty areas of central cities.3" While black families who
have acquired middle-class status have gained some residential mobility,
the poor have not. In the ghetto areas of major cities, black children living
in poverty increasingly are isolated from other children in their schools
and neighborhoods by income as well as race. The risk is great that they
will be afflicted with nutritional and health problems, that they will suffer
parental neglect or abuse, that they will become involved with drugs, that
they will leave school without acquiring basic skills, and that they will
become victims or perpetrators of crime. Some, by dint of extraordinary
talent or effort or with the help of a caring adult, will surmount their
environment, but the odds against them are very high.32
III. THE LINK BETWEEN CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Controversy inevitably surrounds any discussion of both the causes of
the progress described above and the reasons why the conditions of some
people have stagnated or worsened. The advances made by black people
have come through a complex process not easily attributable to any single
set of laws or court decisions. Victories in court were a kind of self-
empowerment for black people that led to other successful legal, political
and community efforts. From these successes followed heightened aspira-
tions and increased confidence, confidence that was reinforced when peo-
ple discovered they had the inner resources to withstand attacks on their
rights. None of this is easily susceptible to calibration by social scientists.
Nevertheless, it is possible to gauge the impact of certain remedy deci-
sions of the courts and related governmental civil rights policies on minor-
ity progress. Chief among these measures are court decisions and govern-
ment actions to reduce racial isolation in the public schools and
affirmative action decisions and policies aimed at increasing minority par-
ticipation in employment and higher education.
A. School Desegregation
Although the Brown decision is more than three decades old, massive
resistance by government officials in the South prevented effective enforce-
31. Id.
32. Social scientists seek to distinguish between people who are temporarily poor and those who
are poor over the long term. While under current standards more than 30 million Americans are
classified as "poor," research indicates that for as many as two-thirds of them poverty is a temporary
condition. Among the characteristics associated with long-term poverty is membership in a female-
headed household. While a majority of the overall poor population is white, it is estimated that the
long-term poor (sometimes used synonymously with the term "underclass") are predominantly non-
white. See K. AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 27-30 (1983).
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ment for almost the entire first half of that period. It was only after Con-
gress endorsed the decision in the 1960's and the Executive branch indi-
cated a readiness to enforce it through lawsuits and the withholding of
funds from noncomplying school districts that the Supreme Court finally
spelled out the remedial obligations of public school systems that had en-
gaged in deliberate segregation. So it was not until 1971 that the Court
determined that pervasive mandatory segregation practices could be re-
dressed only by comprehensive mandatory desegregation, including, if nec-
essary, the use of busing.3 And it was not until 1973 that the Court first
confronted the problem of segregation in the North and West, holding
that similar comprehensive remedies were called for where evidence
showed that segregative practices, though not official or blatant, were
nonetheless deliberate and pervasive. 4 Accordingly, many of the school
districts that have undergone desegregation have done so only in the past
15 years. Even in this short time, the remedy has brought positive results.
As noted, in the 1970's the most striking gains on standardized reading
tests were registered by black elementary students in the Southeast, where
sweeping changes were being made to implement desegregation.3 5 This
strong hint of a link between desegregation and academic achievement is
reinforced by case studies of particular communities that have undergone
desegregation. The studies show that in most situations where courts have
ordered desegregation through busing, the achievement levels of minority
students have risen significantly while those of white students remained
unchanged or have even risen slightly.3"
Interestingly, black children achieve the most dramatic gains when par-
ticipating in metropolitan or county-wide plans that often entail substan-
tial busing.37 These are plans which ordinarily achieve substantial deseg-
regation across socioeconomic class as well as race lines. The findings are
consistent with research showing that disadvantaged children fare better
in schools and classrooms which are made up largely of advantaged stu-
dents rather than being isolated with others of the same background.3 8
33. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Bd., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
34. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
35. See supra note 17.
36. R. CRAIN & R. MAHARD, DESEGREGATION PLANS THAT RAISE BLACK ACHIEVEMENT: A
REvIEw OF THe RESEARCH 35-45 (1982) (desegregation raises achievement and I.Q. test scores for
blacks). The studies also show that certain other factors influence the strength of the academic gains.
The best progress appears to have occurred where desegregation began in kindergarten or first grade,
and where comprehensive programs were instituted that included-diagnostic and compensatory ser-
vices for students and in-service training for teachers.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., OFFICE OF EDuC., DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCA-
TIONAL. OPPORTUNITY (1966); U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOt.S (1967); F. MoSTELLER & D. MOYNIHAN, ON EQUALITY OF EDUCArIONAL OPPORTU-
NIlY (1972). One explanation is that in schools consisting predominantly of advantaged children, the
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In the longer term, black children attending desegregated schools are
more likely to complete high school, to enroll in and graduate from four-
year desegregated colleges, and to major in subjects nontraditional for mi-
nority students-majors that lead to more remunerative jobs and profes-
sions. 9 In addition, low-income black children who receive a desegregated
education have a good chance to avoid the social pathology (such as hostile
encounters with the police or teenage pregnancy) that blights the prospects
of many of their peers.
40
Finally, school desegregation has helped to ease traditional patterns of
rigid residential segregation. 41 This added benefit results, in part, from
the process of desegregation itself. Once the racial character of a neighbor-
hood can no longer easily be stamped by an identification of its schools as
black or white, racial barriers in housing begin to lower. In addition, lon-
gitudinal studies of black and white students who are assigned to desegre-
gated schools suggest that when they become adults they are more likely
than their racially isolated peers to choose to live in racially integrated
neighborhoods.42
The explanations for these positive outcomes of school desegregation are
varied. Some emphasize the ability of schools dominated by white middle-
class parents to command resources (such as good teachers and good li-
braries) that ordinarily are beyond the reach of low-income minority par-
ents. Others stress the positive impact on low-income children of peer
pressures and middle-class norms or the practical know-how and contacts
these youngsters acquire once they enter middle class society.43 Contro-
versy persists, too, about the strength and duration of the positive out-
comes linked with school desegregation and whether, as a matter of policy,
the investments of energy and resources might better have been placed in
norms set by the parents and teachers, and by students themselves, ordinarily are high. Academic
success and advancement to college are expected or demanded. Where schools fall short, middle-class
parents are practiced in wielding influence to bring about change.
39. McPartland, Desegregation and Equity in Higher Education and Employment: Is Progress
Related to the Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools?, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1978, at 108, 110-13, 124, 131; McPartland & Braddock, Going to College and Getting a
Good Job: The Impact of Desegregation, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 141, 146, 150 (W.
Hawley ed. 1981).
40. These findings emerge from a long term study of some 700 low-income students in Hartford,
Connecticut, one group of which began desegregation in the 1960's, while the other remained in
segregated schools. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1985, at C2, col. 2; see also R. CRAIN & J. STRAUSS,
SCHOOL DI.SE;RE-C;A'ION AND BLACK EDUCATIONAL ATAINMENTS (Center for Social Organiza-
tion of Schools, The Johns Hopkins Univ., Rep. No. 359, July 1985).
41. D. PEARCE, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF METROPOLI-
TAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ON HOUSING PATTERNS (1980).
42. Id.
43. D.W. Brogan, a perceptive observer of the American scene, once pointed out that schools were
places where students "instruct each other in how to live in America," noting the lessons in "practical
politics, in organization, in social ease" that are part of the informal curriculum of high schools. D.
BRX;AN, TH. AMERICAN CHARACTER 170, 174-75 (1956).
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other types of educational reform. 4 No serious student of the issue, how-
ever, has disputed the basic proposition of Brown that state-imposed racial
isolation causes harm and that desegregation may bring about educational
opportunity.
B. Fair Employment and Affirmative Action
In contrast to public education, the principal vehicle for combatting ra-
cially discriminatory practices in employment has not been direct judicial
construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, but enforcement and court
interpretation of a statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' As
a matter of statutory interpretation, in 1971, the Supreme Court deter-
mined in Griggs v. Duke Power Company that practices that operated to
deny opportunities to minorities were in some cases prohibited by Title
VII even when they were not intentionally discriminatory.46 This has
meant that employers seeking to screen applicants through the use of in-
telligence examinations or other tests disproportionately excluding minori-
ties must demonstrate that the tests are job related or adopt other screen-
ing techniques that do not disadvantage minority applicants. The broader
approach taken by Congress has enabled enforcement authorities to deal
with practices that disadvantage minorities even where such practices are
not facially discriminatory or racially motivated, standards that would
have to be met if the basis for challenge was a denial of equal protection.47
Major breakthroughs have also occurred at the remedy stage of employ-
ment discrimination cases. Where courts have found the existence of per-
vasive patterns or practices of discrimination, they have ordered strong
affirmative remedies, sometimes restraining employers from hiring new
white employees until proportionate numbers of qualified minority em-
ployees are hired. 48 Those Title VII remedy decisions, along with similar
policies pursued by the executive branch in articulating the equal oppor-
tunity obligations of government contractors,49 have been the subject of
44. Compare Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School De-
segregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) with Jones, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 378
(1976).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
46. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
47. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976).
48. See, e.g., Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064
(1981); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979); United States
v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d
1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local
638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871 (6th
Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,
443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor,
442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
49. President Johnson's Executive Order 11246, adopted in 1965, requires government contrac-
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great controversy as matters of law and policy. But there is little question
that such affirmative action remedies have provided minorities with access
to job opportunities and advancement.
Studies of the huge Bell Telephone system conducted after the company
entered into a Title VII consent decree in 1973 calling for the use of
numerical goals and timetables showed that black workers had made sub-
stantial gains in entering managerial and skilled craft positions.50 Similar
progress was reported in the employment of minorities in skilled positions
in the steel industry following a Title VII consent decree in 1974.51 In
law enforcement, which during the late 1960's and 1970's was a special
target of Title VII litigation and affirmative action remedies, the numbers
of black police officers increased from 24,000 in 1970 to 43,500 in 1980.52
Parallel policies pursued by the executive branch, notably the require-
ment that government contractors set specific targets for the employment
of minorities, have also produced significant gains.5" Goals and timetables
requirements first arose out of an investigation of minority employment in
the construction trades in Philadelphia in the late 1960's. At that time,
fewer than 1 percent of construction workers in the area were minorities.
By 1982, as a result of affirmative action requirements, more than 12
percent of Philadelphia's construction workers were minorities, a dramatic
increase (although short of the established goal of 19 to 26 percent)."
Broader studies of the contract compliance programs have indicated that
companies subject to goals and timetables requirements had greater suc-
cess during the 1970's in increasing minority employment in a variety of
job categories than did companies not subject to such requirements.55
Although one criticism of affirmative action remedies has been that they
tors to take affirmative action in hiring and promoting minorities.
50. See Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity Part 1: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
219, 221 (1981) (statement of economist Bernard Anderson).
51. Id. at 528-29 (statement of economist Phyllis Wallace).
52. See Sawyer, Affirmative Action: Birth and Life of a "Bugaboo," Wash. Post, April 11, 1982,
at Ai0, col. 5. Among the many cases in which courts ordered numerically based relief to correct
patterns of discrimination in state or local law enforcement agencies were Boston Chapter, NAACP v.
Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); NAACP v. Allen, 493
F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); and
Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974).
53. The goals and timetables requirements were adopted in 1970 and 1971 as regulations to
implement E.O. 11246 promulgated by President Johnson in 1965, and are codified at 41 C.F.R. §§
60-2.1 to 60-2.4 (1985).
54. Sawyer, supra note 52, at A10, col. 5.
55. See J. LEONARD, THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1983); OFFICE OF FEDERAL CON-
TRA(:r COMPI.IANCE PR(XRAMS, EMPI.OYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LA-
BOR, A REvIEw OF THE EFFECTr OF EXFCUTIVE ORDER 11246 AND THE FEDERAL CONTRACT COM-
PLIANCE PRO(;RAM ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN (1983). Both
studies are summarized in CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO OPEN
THE DOORS OF JOB OPPORTUNITY 122-26 (1984).
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tend to benefit minorities who are already advantaged or middle class, the
results summarized above suggest otherwise. The focus of much of the
effort has been not just on white collar jobs, but also on law enforcement,
construction work, and craft and production jobs in large companies-all
areas in which the extension of new opportunities has provided upward
mobility for less advantaged minority workers. Nor does the criticism ap-
pear valid for the professions. Studies show that of the increased enroll-
ment of minority students in medical schools during the 1970's, significant
numbers were from families of low income and job status, indicating that
the rising enrollment of minorities in professional schools stemming from
affirmative action policies reflects increased mobility, not simply changing
occupational preferences among middle class minority families.
56
C. Reasons for Failure
If the links between particular civil rights policies and the gains made
in education and employment are not free from dispute, the causes of the
continuing (and in some cases widening) gaps between blacks and whites
are subject to far greater controversy. Conservatives argue that unemploy-
ment, income and poverty data for blacks indicate that civil rights policies
and Great Society social welfare programs have proved ineffective. Liber-
als respond that civil rights remedies have been effective to the extent that
they have been implemented and should be viewed as a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for the advancement of lower income blacks. Affirm-
ative action, they say, cannot bring true employment opportunity for poor
people without basic skills preparation and job training; fair housing laws
are not helpful to people who do not have the resources or government
assistance to acquire decent shelter. Liberals point to evidence of the posi-
tive impact of some (though by no means all) of the Great Society pro-
grams that were designed to provide educational or job mobility. Head-
start and other preschool programs, by beginning the teaching process
early and providing basic health and nutritional services, have helped poor
children start off on a more even footing and have resulted in aptitude
gains that many children have maintained as they grow older.
57 The Job
Corps has achieved a measure of success, recognized by both liberals and
conservatives, in meeting the job preparation needs of economically disad-
56. See Alexis, supra note 16, at 52-71; see also supra note 16.
57. See J. OGBU, MINORITY EDUCATION AND CASTE (1978) (summarizing research on early
childhood education). A recent long-term study of the effects of early-childhood education (beginning
at age 3) on a group of low-income black children in Michigan provides even more encouraging news.
D. WEIKART, CHANGED LivEs (1984).
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vantaged teenagers, particularly minorities and others who have dropped
out of school with low reading skills and no employment record. 58
The difficulty, say advocates of these programs, is that the programs
have been available to only a small proportion of the people in need of
such benefits and services. Similarly, many blacks have yet to reap any
practical benefit from civil rights laws and policies against government
enforced racial isolation. When the Brown decision was issued in 1954,
the movements towards black urbanization and white suburbanization
were still incomplete. By the time the Brown principle was applied to
cities of the North and West, these movements were far more advanced
and many large central city school districts had become predominantly or
almost exclusively minority in their racial composition. One potential so-
lution to this problem-treating an entire metropolitan area as a single
entity for purposes of school desegregation-was inhibited when the Su-
preme Court erected stringent proof requirements for cross-district deseg-
regation.59 In short, many black children, born since the Brown decision,
have grown up in complete racial isolation. For them, to paraphrase G.K.
Chesterton's observation about Christianity, it cannot be said that desegre-
gation has been tried and found wanting but rather that it has been found
difficult and not tried.
In the economic sphere, liberals and conservatives largely agree that
major changes in unemployment and poverty rates are influenced far more
by macroeconomic forces than by policies targeted to anti-discrimination
or job training. Few would dispute the proposition that in recent years the
prospects for advancement of those who are the least well-off have been
dimmed by the slow growth of the American economy, by the shift in the
economy away from manufacturing (particularly in areas such as
automobiles and steel where production-line jobs traditionally have offered
channels of opportunity for those at the bottom of the ladder) and by the
development of cheap labor markets abroad. Once the focus shifts from
diagnosis to prescription, views vary widely. Some conservatives believe
that answers lie in government deregulation and in supply-side economics
which, they assert, will ultimately improve the economic conditions of ev-
eryone, including the poor. Some liberals argue that the remedies must
include government initiatives to enlarge the supply of jobs in the public
and private sectors and policies that dedicate a larger share of the nation's
wealth to meeting public needs.
In the area of welfare, there is also widespread agreement that current
government policies are a failure, but much disagreement about the rea-
58. Slobig, Young Americans, Their Deteriorating Status in the Labor Market (unpublished
manuscript 1983).
59. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken 1).
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sons and needed reforms. Conservatives feel strongly that federal welfare
assistance, augmented since the 1960's by other entitlement programs such
as food stamps, has created an unhealthy dependency among the poor,
robbing them of incentives to seek work and inducing them to become
permanent wards of the state. For many of these conservatives, the appro-
priate response is a major reduction in welfare assistance of various kinds,
a step they believe will lead to a greater assumption of responsibility by
private institutions such as the church and a renewal of individual
initiative.
Liberals believe that, far from rewarding idleness, the benefit levels of
welfare programs in most states are so low that they do not meet basic
needs. Further, they say that if economic independence is the goal, it can
be achieved only by providing an array of services including job training
and low-cost day care for the many young mothers on welfare. Liberals
also note that if welfare policy is to encourage people to work, payments
should continue to be made, albeit in reduced amounts, to people who are
able to earn some income through their own labors. When people with
such marginal incomes are cut off from benefits on the grounds that they
are not "truly needy," dependency may be encouraged, not discouraged.
Most liberals call for the establishment of national welfare standards that
would raise benefit levels in most states and the provision of government
services, such as basic skills and job training and child care, which they
believe will foster economic independence.
D. Summary
The choices made concerning economic and social welfare issues from
among the welter of conflicting diagnoses, assumptions, values and pre-
scriptions will have an important impact on the futures of many people
who live in poverty. It is clear, too, that most of the issues must be re-
solved in the crucible of legislative debate in a democratic society. But the
debate about economic and social welfare issues affecting the poor cannot
be divorced from continuing judicial questions of equal protection for mi-
norities. In examining those questions, thirty years of experience since
Brown have clarified a number of matters. One is that apart from the
legal basis for the decision, the Brown Court was on solid ground in find-
ing a link between state imposed segregation and the denial of educational
opportunity and in assuming that the removal of racial isolation would
create conditions favorable to the advancement of black people. A second
is that, whatever the theoretical possibilities may be for the development
of opportunity and self-sufficiency in an environment of racial isolation, in
practice minorities who are most isolated in society today are also those
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who are worst off.60 A third is that many black people, including large
numbers born since 1954, have never been offered any affirmative remedy
from the conditions of segregation and deprivation imposed by the old
caste system.
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR RACE CONSCIOUS REMEDIES
Equity jurisprudence is dotted with maxims designed to aid judges in
fashioning remedies. "The nature of the violation," we are told, "deter-
mines the scope of the remedy." The purpose of a remedy, it is said, is to
restore the person wronged to the position he would have occupied "but
for the commission of the wrong."
Such axioms may indeed furnish useful guidance in cases involving in-
dividual victims and perpetrators, discrete violations and easily identifiable
consequences of the violations. But how does one match remedy to the
scope of a violation consisting of the creation of a state-enforced caste sys-
tem, where the wrong subjected a whole class of people to conditions of
isolation and deprivation for more than three centuries? How can judges
not possessed with powers of clairvoyance ascertain the position that
members of the wronged class would have occupied but for the shackles
imposed by this caste system?
Faced with this dilemma, the federal courts over the past two decades
generally have opted for affirmative redress, remedies urged by plaintiffs
that would change their practical situation, not merely their formal posi-
tion in the eyes of the law.61 The basic principle guiding the courts has
been a belief that the caste system, enforced for so many years, necessarily
visited harmful results on members of the disfavored class-results that
went beyond the immediate impact of any particular racial practice and
that would not be redressed fully by the simple termination of the prac-
tice. Further, the Supreme Court decided that proof of unshakable causal
60. It has been pointed out that the departure of blacks who have secured jobs, housing and other
opportunities outside racially isolated areas worsens the situation of those who remain by depriving
the community of resources and potential leadership. But a policy of preventing "brain drain" by
urging blacks to forgo opportunities and remain in racially isolated communities hardly seems feasible.
61. In seeking to link remedy to violation, the Court has followed what some commentators term
"the corrective conception" of antidiscrimination law. See Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School
Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 731-35 (1986). Two other ap-
proaches, one extremely narrow and the other extremely broad, avoid the dilemma by denying the
relevance of linkage. Under the "prohibitory" approach pursued by the Reagan Administration's Jus-
tice Department, the only class relief viewed as appropriate is future-oriented. Defendants may be
ordered to cease their discriminatory practices but any additional affirmative redress for the class, even
if designed to undo the effects of past discrimination, is regarded as unnecessary and, indeed, as an
unacceptable departure from the concept of "color blindness." In contrast, proponents of a "distribu-
tive" or results-oriented concept regard integration or fair allocations of goods and services among the
races as appropriate remedies once a violation of the Constitution is found whether or not the remedy
can be linked to the wrong. Neither approach has found favor in the federal courts. See id. at 735-39
(criticizing prohibitory and distributive approaches).
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links between the violation and the remedy sought would not be a precon-
dition of affording broad, affirmative remedies. Instead, the Court chose to
gauge the propriety of particular remedies by taking a common sense view
of the likely consequences of particular practices.
The general approach of the judiciary is well illustrated by the Su-
preme Court's handling of remedy in school desegregation cases. Once the
Southern strategy of massive resistance had run its course, school boards
had to develop plans for desegregation. Two methods favored by the
school boards were "neighborhood" school assignments, under which stu-
dents would attend schools close to their homes, and "freedom of choice"
plans, under which segregated patterns would be altered only through the
exercise of parental choice.
In assessing neighborhood school plans, courts came to grips with the
fact that to some substantial, if unquantifiable, degree the state-imposed
segregation of the public schools had shaped the racial makeup of neigh-
borhoods."2 Recognizing that people tend to cluster near the schools their
children are permitted to attend and that therefore racially segregated
schools contributed to segregated residential patterns, the courts refused to
accept ostensibly neutral neighborhood assignments that would perpetuate
school segregation as constitutionally adequate redress.
Similarly, the Supreme Court effectively rejected "freedom of choice" as
a constitutionally adequate remedy by holding that such plans would be
permitted only where school authorities could demonstrate that they
would produce integrative results."' Implicit in the Court's decision was
an understanding that a caste system that relegated black people to posi-
tions of economic dependency and physical vulnerability was hardly con-
ducive to the free exercise of choice. These conditions of dependency and
vulnerability persisted even after the formal restraints of segregation laws
were lifted, as did fears and prejudices among whites engendered by many
years of state-imposed isolation." Plaintiffs could not have demonstrated
that the remedy they sought-schools with a racial composition that
roughly reflected the composition of the school system as a
62. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 7, 14, 20-21 (1971).
63. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
64. The Court in Green demonstrated an awareness that these conditions existed. Id. at 440 n.5
(quoting UNITED STATES COMMISION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
1966-67, at 88 (1967)). But ruling out "freedom of choice" plans only on proof that the choice of
black parents was inhibited would have set off a new round of litigation that might have lasted an-
other decade. Thus the Court chose the simple test of whether the plan resulted in actual desegrega-
tion. For a fuller discussion of the remedial principles of Green, see Gewirtz, supra note 61. Some
have argued that black people, as victims of enforced segregation, should be permitted to opt out of a
remedy to which they may be entitled and their choices should not be presumed to be coerced. But the
rights of black parents who seek a full remedy for their children cannot be completely vindicated by a
plan that permits such exception. The right is not simply to attend a formerly white school but to
attend a system from which the taint of racial discrimination in assignment has been removed.
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whole-mirrored the situation that would have existed "but for" the con-
stitutional violation. But acceptance of the remedy proffered by defendant
school authorities would have yielded only a formal equality, devoid of
practical significance and oblivious to the real consequences of the reign of
segregation.
One additional school case illustrates the practical approach the courts
have taken. In Milliken II, the Supreme Court, as part of the redress
given after a finding of deliberate segregation of the Detroit school system,
upheld lower court rulings requiring state and local officials to provide
resources for compensatory education programs in reading and mathemat-
ics, in-service training of teachers, and guidance and counseling pro-
grams.6 5 The Court reasoned as follows:
Children who have been . . . educationally and culturally set apart
from the larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech,
conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation. They are
likely to acquire speech habits, for example, which vary from the
environment in which they must ultimately function and compete, if
they are to enter and be a part of that community. This is not pecu-
liar to race; in this setting, it can affect any children who, as a
group, are isolated by force of law from the mainstream. . . . The
root condition shown by this record must be treated directly by spe-
cial training at the hands of teachers prepared for that task.6"
Again, the link between the violation and the remedy may be viewed by
some as less than airtight.6 7 But the Justices chose to take a common sense
approach to the issue and to seek correction of problems that clearly in-
hibited opportunity for black children.
The only major departure from the relatively liberal and pragmatic re-
medial approach the Court has taken in school desegregation cases was its
rejection in Milliken I of an effort to secure an interdistrict school rem-
edy."" In that case, the five-member majority acknowledged the commis-
sion of constitutional violations by Michigan and Detroit government offi-
cials, the responsibility of the state for the drawing of school district lines,
and the existence of pronounced segregation as between the predominantly
black schools of the Detroit school district and the white schools of subur-
ban districts. But the majority had great difficulty seeing any linkage be-
tween the segregative acts and the segregated conditions. Justice Burger
simply asserted that segregative acts that "within an autonomous" district
65. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken 11).
66. Id. at 287-88 (citation omitted).
67. Although the Court said that there was "abundant evidence" to support its conclusion and
remedy, the record in support consisted principally of the expert opinions of educators. Id. at 273 n.9.
68. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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would give rise to a duty to provide relief, or at least to a presumption of
wide impact, did not carry the same weight when a school district line
was involved.69 Nor, despite the powerful teaching of Cooper v. Aaron
0
that a state may not evade its constitutional obligations by compartmental-
izing them, was the majority prepared to consider evidence in the record
that segregated public schools in the Detroit metropolitan area were the
product of racial discrimination in housing on the part of government offi-
cials. 1 Accordingly, although constitutional violations had occurred and
although no member of the Milliken majority asserted a clear conviction
that racial segregation in the Detroit metropolitan area was adventitious
or largely the product of private choice or economic factors, the Court
denied an interdistrict remedy.
2 The Court, however, did leave the door
open to interdistrict remedies in other cases on appropriate showings of
violations with "interdistrict effects," and it has refused to disturb lower
court holdings in subsequent cases that the conditions for metropolitan
relief had been satisfied.
7 3
The Court's treatment of fair employment issues has been more in line
with the pragmatism of Green, Swann and Milliken H. In Griggs, the
Court was interpreting legislative history that was far from clear.
7 4 A nar-
row view might have focused exclusively on the question of fault, absolv-
ing employers and unions who were not acting out of bad motives from
the responsibility of making costly changes in their employee selection
processes. Further, the Court might have reasoned that whatever the past
practices of discrimination that the Duke Power Company may have en-
gaged in, the disproportionate failure rate of minorities on tests used by
the company was traceable more to discrimination in public school sys-
tems than to the practices of the employer. But the Court was less con-
cerned with attempting the impossible task of allocating responsibility for
69. Id. at 741-42.
70. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
71. The majority simply ducked the housing issue with the observation that although the 
district
court had made findings of housing violations, the court of appeals did not consider them because 
it
found the school violations sufficient. 418 U.S. at 728 n.7. This refusal to consider the housing viola-
tions was at odds with longstanding Supreme Court practice. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 475-76 n.6 (1970). Justice Stewart, the one member of the majority who considered the 
housing
proof, found it unpersuasive and suggested that the factors producing racial separation in metropolitan
areas might be so complex as to be "unknown and perhaps unknowable." 418 U.S. at 756 n.2.
72. One plausible explanation for the Court's departure from previously established principle was
the politically explosive character of the case. Justice Marshall said that "[tioday's holding, 
I fear, is
more a reflection of a perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitu-
tion than it is the product of neutral principles of law." 418 U.S. at 814. See Taylor, The Supreme
Court and Urban Reality: A Tactical Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley, 21 WAYNE L. 
REv. 751
(1975).
73. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977);
United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
838
(1980).
74. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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what may have been multiple wrongs7 5 than with finding workable solu-
tions. As it said in a later case:
Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the edu-
cation and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces be-
yond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidi-
ous burden on such citizens for the remainder of their lives.76
In dealing with explicit racial goals or set-asides, the Court has suggested
that the standard is one of practical necessity-whether lesser measures
would suffice to overcome the institutional inertia that works to exclude
minorities from job opportunities even after formal practices of discrimi-
nation have been terminated.77
In employment, the tests of practicality and of balancing competing in-
terests work two ways. A black person apparently may be denied a job he
would have held "but for" the discriminatory practices of an employer if
awarding the position would require the displacement of an incumbent
white person.7 8 In determining whether race-conscious remedies "unnec-
essarily trammel the interests of the white employees,' '79 courts may draw
lines between actions that disappoint the expectations of whites and those
that uproot them from vested status. If the Court perceives such line-
drawing as being generally fair, it may reject the argument that in a par-
ticular instance one or another individual may suffer hardship.80 In short,
75. In Griggs, the decision was based in part on the fact that the Duke Power Company had in
the past intentionally excluded minority applicants from its workforce. To permit exclusionary prac-
tices to be replaced by a "neutral" test that adversely affected minorities would have perpetuated past
discrimination. But a new employer with no history of past discrimination is also subject to the Griggs
rule against tests that adversely affect minority applicants unless justified by business necessity.
76. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973).
77. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 462-63 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
Lower courts have justified the use of a hiring ratio in similar terms, such as where it is determined
that it "represents the only rational, non-arbitrary means of eradicating past evils." NAACP v. Allen,
493 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974).
78. Although the Stotts case did not deal explicitly with the situation described, Justice White
noted that even a person adversely affected by discrimination "is not automatically entitled to have a
non-minority employee laid off to make room for him." Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
104 S.Ct. 2576, 2588 (1984).
79. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
80. In at least one case, a court ordered that a white worker whose expectation of a promotion
was disappointed by implementation of an affirmative action plan receive compensation for that disap-
pointment. McAleer v. AT&T, 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976). The remedy is not dissimilar from
that provided to a minority or female worker when the position she was discriminatorily denied is
occupied. The relief ordered may include "front pay" (i.e., the salary the employee would receive if
she were occupying the position) and priority consideration for any future vacancy. See Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). Courts, however, do not have the authority and
flexibility available to legislatures in seeking to mitigate harshness. In some states, efforts have been
made to avoid lay-offs through various forms of worksharing. Six states have adopted short-time com-
pensation laws in which employees whose hours have been reduced are able to supplement their
income through payments from the state unemployment insurance system. See CITIZENS COMMISSION
ON Civii. RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE AcTION TO OPEN THE DoORs OF JOB OPPORTUNITY, 156 (1984).
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the Court time and again has taken the broad formula articulated in
Brown 1I-that "equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public
and private needs" 8 -and sought to apply it in affirmative and pragmatic
ways.
If the imprecision of the Court's approach offends the purist, it must be
weighed against alternative approaches to remedy. The principal alterna-
tive was articulated by Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Dayton
Board of Education v. Brinkman:
If [school segregation] violations are found, the District Court in the
first instance . . . must determine how much incremental segrega-
tive effect these violations had on the racial distribution of the Day-
ton school population as presently constituted, when that distribution
is compared to what it would have been in the absence of such con-
stitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that
difference .... 82
Justice Rehnquist warns against the dangers of a school desegregation
remedy that does too much. His words are echoed by the words and poli-
cies of the Reagan Administration, which in education, employment and
other contexts would not permit opportunities to be offered to a black
person who could not establish that she was a direct victim of discrimina-
tion or if it appeared that the remedy might permit her to occupy a posi-
tion she might not have reached absent discrimination.
3 Assuming that
some segregation would likely exist in public schools even if the govern-
ment had never decreed it, there is no known method for extracting it
from the immeasurable consequences of a public order that separated and
stigmatized black people for more than two centuries. Unless such a tech-
nique is discovered, Justice Rehnquist's quest for "incremental segregative
effect" is an exercise in fiction.
In the film It's a Wonderful Life, the protagonist, played by James
Stewart, considers his life a failure and is on the verge of suicide when a
guardian angel intervenes. The angel is able to recreate the distressed cir-
cumstances of the hero's town, friends and family as they would have been
if the hero had never lived and thus demonstrates to him that he had not
been a failure but had made a real contribution to the well-being and
prosperity of all. The movie ends happily.
81. 349 U.S. at 300 (footnotes omitted).
82. 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (Dayton 1) (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., Hearings on School Desegregation Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Committee on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1981) (statement of
William B. Reynolds).
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Lacking such divine intervention, judges and lawyers in school segrega-
tion cases cannot recreate the situation that would have existed if the
wrong had never occurred. The party bearing the legal burden of persua-
sion would always lose. Because Justice Rehnquist would place that bur-
den on black parents and children by requiring them to prove that segre-
gation would not exist in any event and because there is no way to meet
that burden, plaintiffs would rarely, if ever, achieve more than a token
remedy.
A majority of the current Court has rejected the Rehnquist view, saying
that once deliberate practices of discrimination are proved, it is the de-
fendants' burden to demonstrate that any segregation they propose to al-
low to remain was innocently caused; 4 defendants can no more meet this
burden than black plaintiffs could meet the Rehnquist burden. Although
the majority's use of presumptions may be no less artificial than Rehn-
quist's, the Court's approach is grounded in an understanding that the
risks of doing too little far exceed those of doing too much. If a court does
too little-that is, permits the continuation of some segregation that may
be attributable to government bias-the harm is irreparable. Some minor-
ity children will spend their entire school careers in racially isolated class-
rooms designed for them by government authorities. Similarly if a black
litigant is denied a job opportunity because she cannot establish that she is
a direct victim of proven discriminatory practices or because race con-
scious remedies are deemed excessive, she may never have another such
opportunity.
If, on the other hand, a court should err by doing too much, by, for
example, ordering more desegregation than is warranted, the harm is far
less serious and is of a temporary nature. Although parents who would
choose to send their children to racially homogeneous schools will find
their freedom constrained in that they will no longer be able to assure that
choice by living in a segregated neighborhood, this can hardly be deemed
a constraint that does serious injury. It is also a temporary constraint, for
the court has made clear that once desegregation plans have been imple-
mented for a period of time, courts will not be responsible for correcting
resegregation that occurs unless it is caused by government action.8 5 When
the duration of the remedy is thus limited, the harm from doing too much
is minimized if not eliminated. For if segregation is the result of private
preference, it will reemerge, creating in practice the condition (what
"would have been in the absence of . . . constitutional violations") that
Justice Rehnquist says he would like to attain.
84. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton 11); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. I, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
85. Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32.
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Indeed, the Court's current formulation of remedy may err on the side
of doing too little rather than too much. It is reasonable to assume that the
continued preferences of many citizens for racial segregation result, in
part, from many years of conditioning of attitudes under the government-
imposed regimen of segregation. If the period allowed for active court su-
pervision of the effort to accomplish the affirmative duty to desegregate
and to eliminate official discrimination is a short one (and many courts
interpret Swann as permitting three to five years for "racial balancing") it
is questionable whether there is sufficient time to counteract the effects of
years of state-imposed segregation."
Race conscious employment remedies, like affirmative school desegrega-
tion plans, are justified by courts as temporary expedients that will lapse
once the original wrong has been corrected. Critics of such remedies have
expressed fears that, whatever the original intention, preferences are likely
to become ingrained. Moreover, they note that the time span of the rem-
edy in some decisions may be as long as it takes for the minority
workforce of a defendant to reflect that of the relevant labor market.,
7 But
under the most stringent of such remedy orders, employers have available
to them the defense that good faith efforts did not produce minority appli-
cants who met the employer's legitimate needs. Ordinarily, the greatest
movement to train and hire employees occurs in the years immediately
following a court order or consent decree. If progress does not occur then,
it seems hardly likely that the passage of time will produce more rigorous
enforcement. To the contrary, as the remedies sought become more remote
in time from the blatant wrongs that originally gave rise to them, the zeal
for enforcement may naturally, if unfortunately, be expected to fade.
In sum, there is abundant evidence that affirmative remedies, notably
those that have broken old patterns of racial isolation and provided tangi-
ble opportunities for education and employment, have been the principal
legal engine of black progress. The attack that has been mounted on the
86. The dangers are well illustrated by the recent decision of the Fourth Circuit in Riddick v.
School Bd. of the City of Norfolk, No. 84-1815 (4th Cir., Jan. 8, 1985). Contra Dowell v. Board of
Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schools, No. 85-1086 (10th Cir. June 26, 1986). In the Riddick case,
the district court, having ceased active supervision of a 1971 plan in 1976 and declared the Norfolk
district "unitary," permitted the district in 1985 to substitute a "neighborhood school plan" for ele-
mentary schools with the knowledge that ten schools would become virtually all black. Although seg-
regated public housing projects continued to exist and the "neighborhood" plan might well have been
regarded as a new intentional act of racial segregation, the district and circuit courts accepted the
board's justifications that the plan was needed to stem white flight and the loss of parental participa-
tion in school affairs. Thus, racial attitudes engendered in part by government-imposed segregation
were used to justify a return to segregation.
87. In Weber, Justice Brennan described the agreement between the Kaiser company and the
union as designed not to maintain racial balance but to eliminate a manifest imbalance, noting that
preferential selection of black trainees would end as soon as the craft workers in the Gramercy Plant
approximate the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 442 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
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legal basis for affirmative remedy rests on a failure (or refusal) to under-
stand the pervasive effects of the caste system and the need for practical,
direct, remedial measures to prevent these effects from continuing long
after the termination of formal policies of exclusion and discrimination.
After two decades of experience, however, the limitations of race con-
scious civil rights remedies standing alone as a means for advancement for
low-income black people are as apparent as the positive results such reme-
dies have achieved. One may forcefully argue that the depressed economic
status and earning abilities of many blacks result from the old order of
racism and the failure of government to intervene in any meaningful way
to provide opportunities. With the passage of time, however, such argu-
ments, though valid, are less likely to persuade. And if legislative support
for programs such as child care, job training, health and nutrition assis-
tance diminishes, affirmative action remedies will lack the base for effec-
tiveness. The issue then becomes whether equal protection doctrine has
anything meaningful to say about the current conditions of poor black
people and whether the courts have any significant role to play in amelio-
rating those conditions.
V. THE COURTS AND THE ISOLATION OF THE POOR
In his 1960 defense of the Brown decision, Charles Black put the issue
as follows:
[I]f a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system
which is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in
an inferior station, and if the question is then solemnly propounded
whether such a race is being treated 'equally,' I think we ought to
exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of
laughter.8"
In the 1980's, in large part because of the success in implementing Brown,
the question requires reformulation. No longer can it be said that a
"whole race" is being kept in an inferior status. Once the shackles of the
caste system were removed, many black people by dint of their own efforts
struggled and attained equal status, albeit a status tinged with periodic
unpleasant reminders from bigoted whites of the old order of discrimina-
tion. At the same time, other members of the race are confined within a
system that keeps them in an inferior status and makes it extremely diffi-
cult to acquire the skills and the tools necessary to effect an escape. Gov-
ernment policies offer little or no help to people in acquiring such skills,
88. Black, supra note 4, at 421.
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and government practices keep the poor geographically isolated from the
rest of society, cut off from services and contacts that might assist their
mobility. Because of our failure to eliminate the continuing effects of the
old racial caste system, black people form a disproportionately large part
of this class of poor. Yet their current circumstances do not differ materi-
ally from whites who are also locked in poverty.
It is this changed environment that has spurred increasing academic
discussion of the "declining significance of race"-the basic proposition
being that the plight of the black underclass is now determined largely by
socioeconomic factors such as a lack of education and skills, rather than
racial factors such as continued discrimination.
9 For conservative propo-
nents of the thesis, the prescription is a kind of "benign neg-
lect"-opposition to race conscious civil rights remedies and a belief that
government should get out of the social reform business and rely upon the
market place.
For more radical adherents of the "class not race" thesis, the moral is
that government should attack the causes of poverty and deprivation on a
far broader scale than is reflected in the piecemeal civil rights and social
welfare efforts of the past and present. Many would argue for the estab-
lishment of a series of entitlements in the areas of jobs, housing, education
and welfare and for revisions in economic and tax policy designed to re-
distribute wealth to lower income people.
The merits and the politics of these views and proposals will not be
discussed here, other than to note that conservative proponents of "class
not race" seem remarkably oblivious to the continuing effects of the racial
caste system on the economic and social status of black people, while more
radical adherents of the thesis tend to underrate both the progress made
under civil rights laws and the unique institutional commitment the Su-
preme Court has revealed when dealing with racial as distinguished from
other forms of discrimination. Rather, the question to be examined in this
concluding section is what role, if any, the judiciary may appropriately
play in reform efforts designed to deal with the debilitating effects of dis-
tinctions based on wealth or class rather than race.
A review of the history of wealth discrimination cases suggests a pessi-
mistic prognosis for litigation that seeks benefit entitlements based on con-
stitutional rather than statutory arguments or that calls for significant re-
distributions of public resources. In contrast, the institutional concerns of
the judiciary that have inhibited relief in those types of cases may not be a
bar to suits challenging government practices that isolate poor people and
89. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 11.
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deny them access to services and jobs that may be critical to their
advancement.
A. Pathways and Barriers to Judicial Relief for the Poor
The effort to use the courts to protect the interests of the poor gained
vitality in 1941 when the Supreme Court invalidated a California law
prohibiting the entry of non-resident indigents into the state. Justice Jack-
son, in a concurring opinion, wrote,
[A] man's mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a
state to test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United
States. . . . The mere state of being without funds is a neutral
fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed or color. 90
From that point on, through the 1960's, the Supreme Court struck
down a series of state-imposed constraints on the right to vote,91 to obtain
legal assistance when charged with a crime, 2 and to receive welfare bene-
fits without having to meet state residency requirements. 3 Almost all of
the cases, however, involved practices that impeded access of poor people
to the political or judicial processes, such as the requirement that citizens
pay poll taxes in order to vote or that defendants in criminal cases pay the
costs of their own transcripts in order to appeal. In most of these cases,
the costs of providing access to the poor were relatively minimal.
Once the courts faced claims that potentially involved much larger re-
distributions of resources, the decisions began to go the other way. The
problem that faced the courts is well illustrated by the Rodriguez decision
in 1974 in which the Supreme Court by a five-to-four margin rejected a
Fourteenth Amendment claim challenging inequities in the financing of
public schools.9 ' The claimants argued that strict scrutiny should be ap-
plied to school financing because public education was a "fundamental
right" and because most of those who suffered inequity under the Texas
finance plan were low-income people. But the majority was clearly troub-
led by the lack of limiting principles in the plaintiffs' claim. The class of
people disadvantaged in the view of the majority was not well-defined by
90. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941).
91. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
92. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
93. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro, state requirements conditioning the
receipt of welfare assistance on meeting one year residency rules were invalidated on equal protection
grounds. In Edwards, the Justices, though concerned with similar impediments on the right to travel,
had rested their decision variously on the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses. 314 U.S.
160.
94. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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income.95 And if public education were deemed a fundamental right, could
not similar claims be made about such matters as police and fire protec-
tion, nutrition, and housing?
Similarly, if courts were to venture beyond voting and the criminal de-
fense system to mandate the provision of free services to people without
means, where would they draw the line? If the courts were to read the
equal protection clause as mandating an "affirmative duty to lift the
handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances,"
9" they
might find themselves issuing remedies calling for the redistribution of
resources in such areas as housing, education, health and municipal ser-
vices. Judges would be subjected to charges that they had usurped legisla-
tive prerogatives by redistributing resources that elected bodies had al-
ready decided to distribute in a different way.
Nor is it merely abstract notions of judicial restraint that feed such con-
cerns. The reality is that the legislative branch controls the national purse
strings and the executive branch possesses the police authority to enforce
the laws. Courts must rely on the cooperation of these other branches, as
well as on public acceptance of the legitimacy of their decisions, if those
decisions are to be accepted and enforced. A series of decisions calling for
large-scale redistribution of resources, however strongly based on consid-
erations of fundamental fairness, could bring on the kind of confrontation
that the judiciary normally seeks to avoid.
This does not mean that the courts will or ought to avoid entirely those
remedies that place claims on the public fisc. Lower courts have ordered
states to appropriate substantial sums of money to make prison systems
minimally habitable and to provide minimum levels of care and treatment
at state mental health facilities.97 The Supreme Court, as we have seen,
has mandated the expenditure of substantial sums for compensatory edu-
cation to redress the wrongs done by racial segregation 8 and has required
that states make money available for the free public education of children
of undocumented aliens." In almost all of these cases, however, the court
has been able to discern some limiting principle (e.g., the "absolute"
rather than the relative deprivation of a public service in Plyler) that
would prevent the decision from being extended widely to the other areas.
Absent such special circumstances, the courts have sent a clear message,
particularly over the past decade, that they will not serve as major vehicles
95. Id. at 28.
96. This was the characterization used by Justice Harlan in dissent in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 34 (1956).
97. See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d
507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
98. See Milliken I, 433 U.S. 267.
99. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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for redressing economic injustices visited on the poor."' 0 They have re-
jected such claims even in circumstances where it was demonstrated that
the economic distinction had particularly harsh consequences for black
citizens.' 01
B. The Isolation of the Poor
If claims to benefit entitlements have fared badly in the courts, do poor
people have grievances that are more amenable to judicial redress? In
1986, it seems clear that the practice at all levels of government is to
physically isolate poor people. National housing policy aims to achieve the
lofty goal of "a decent home and a suitable living environment" for all
American citizens. 102 But housing officials throughout the country rou-
tinely locate housing for low-income people in the poorest neighborhoods
of a community where their neighbors will be other low-income people,
usually of the same race.10 3 Moreover, the officials of affluent jurisdictions
have managed to exclude the poor entirely from their communities
through the manipulation of zoning and land use controls that bar the
construction of housing affordable by low-income families.
This physical isolation denies poor people access to job opportunities in
burgeoning suburban areas and to superior public services including pub-
lic schools. Political boundary lines have been treated by the Supreme
Court as at least partial barriers to the racial (and thus economic) integra-
tion of public schools.' 0 And even where some racial and economic mix
exists in the schools, rigid tracking practices begun in the early grades
often assure that lower-income children are isolated in classrooms and
programmed for low-status occupations.?0 5
Evidence of the harm that inheres in such isolation has been discussed
throughout this essay and clearly applies in many cases to class as well as
to racial segregation. Indeed, Justice Burger specifically noted in Milliken
100. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (state not constitutionally required to appoint
counsel for indigent state prisoners seeking discretionary review); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (970) (upholding state's maximum grant provisions in AFDC programs under which large fam-
ilies received less than computed need); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding Texas
scheme of allotting lower percentage of calculated need to AFDC families than to recipients of other
types of aid).
101. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 547.
102. Housing Act of 1949, P.L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949).
103. See, e.g., CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A DECENT HOME (1983) (federal
housing policies segregate the poor).
104. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The 5-4 majority ruled that inter-district desegregation
was permissible only when, through boundary manipulation or other actions, government officials had
caused segregation that had effects across district lines.
105. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801
(1968). Judge J. Skelly Wright, who wrote the opinion, is one of the very few jurists who have
discussed the impact of segregative practices in terms of class as well as race.
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II that the damage done to children who are "educationally and culturally
set apart from the larger community" is "not peculiar to race [and] can
affect any children who, as a group, are isolated by force of law from the
mainstream."' 106 The opportunities made available through ending gov-
ernment-enforced isolation have also become clear in the thirty-plus years
since Brown.'0
A potential judicial remedy for the consequences of isolation by class
status is suggested by an analysis begun but not completed in the Rodri-
guez case. The Court accepted the time-honored concept of community
control as justification for permitting educational expenditures to be deter-
mined by the property wealth of each community, even though this
method resulted in massive disparities.'0 8 According to this view, each
community should be free to decide for itself how much it should be taxed
for local services and how the taxes should be allocated for various pur-
poses. The plaintiffs objected that local control was illusory because in a
property-poor community citizens could decide that they valued public ed-
ucation highly and were willing to tax themselves heavily and still pro-
duce much less revenue for public schools than a property-rich community
could with much less tax effort.
"Well," the Rodriguez majority might have replied, "citizens who value
public education highly are free to vote with their feet-to relocate to
communities where public schools are well financed and taxes are low."
The response, of course, is that while this option may be available to
some, it is foreclosed to poor people who are barred by zoning, land use
controls, or other measures from securing residences in communities that
provide the services they desire.
Thus, the class of people most directly harmed by inequitable state fi-
nancing schemes is anything but amorphous. It consists of poor people,
including and especially the black poor, who have no freedom of move-
ment. If the Court's belief, implicit or explicit, is that reform of state fi-
nancing systems that result in grossly disparate public services is too legis-
lative or political a task to be undertaken by the judiciary, then a measure
of equal protection may be achieved by removing impediments that poor
106. Milliken i, 433 U.S. at 287 (citation omitted).
107. In Hills v. Gautreaux, the Supreme Court upheld lower court orders requiring the United
States to help make housing available to low-income black citizens outside the central city as a remedy
for segregative practices. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). Positive results stemming from the decision are re-
ported in U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, GAUTREAUX HOUSING DEMON-
STRATION: AN EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT ON PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS (1979). A more re-
cent study, showing beneficial school results for low-income black children, is summarized in URBAN
AFFAIRS NEws 1 (Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern University, Fall
1985). Evidence on the beneficial effects of school desegregation is summarized supra notes 36-41 and
accompanying text.
108. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-50.
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people face in gaining access to better services. Such an approach would
be consonant with the recognition of a basic right to freedom of movement
in the Edwards and Shapiro cases 09 and with the recognition as early as
Edwards that "the task of providing assistance to the needy has ceased to
be local in character."
1 1 0
Of course, judicial redress limited to removing discriminatory site selec-
tion practices or land use controls may turn out to be ineffective relief for
the poor. Its efficacy depends on the existence of government subsidy pro-
grams to bring standard housing within the reach of low-income people.
Without such affirmative assistance, the removal of negative impediments
will not result in tangible changes in the lives of poor people. Over the
last several years, federal housing assistance to low-income people has
been on the wane, and even in its peak years, it did not come close to
meeting the need. Thus, legislative inaction could largely negate the po-
tential gains of judicial relief.
The same observation, however, is applicable to the Brown decision. It
is clear, at least in retrospect, that Brown's success depended on the will-
ingness of the legislative and executive branches to furnish affirmative
support. The Court became the catalyst that impelled the nation to con-
front problems most people preferred to ignore. By confronting govern-
ment policies and practices of isolating the poor, the Court could serve a
similar role.
C. How Much Judicial Scrutiny for Poor People?
As in many cases of constitutional adjudication, the outcome of chal-
lenges to government practices of isolating the poor is likely to turn on the
level of scrutiny the Court is willing to apply them. If all that is required
is a rational basis for practices that deprive the poor of access to services
and opportunities, justification will ordinarily be found. For example,
land use practices that exclude housing for low-income people may be
rationalized as serving a variety of economic and environmental purposes.
The basis for invoking a stricter standard of review is found in the
celebrated footnote four of the Carolene Products decision:
109. Edwards, 314 U. S. 160; Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618. It would not be consonant, however, with
the Court's decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). There the Court upheld an amend-
ment to the California Constitution allowing the development of low-rent housing in a community to
be vetoed by a local referendum.
110. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174-75. A contemporary statement of the obligation of communities to
share the responsibility for meeting the housing needs of the poor is found in South Burlington
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied & appeal dismissed,
423 U.S. 808 (1975). In Mt. Laurel, the New Jersey Supreme Court found in the state equal protec-
tion clause a basis for requiring jurisdictions to meet this shared responsibility.
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[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those po-
litical processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry."' 1
If Carolene Products continues to provide even a rough guide to those
circumstances in which courts ought to be ready to intervene to curb
majoritarian excesses against disfavored groups, then "searching judicial
inquiry" should be invoked with respect to government practices that
work to the disadvantage of poor people. 1
In one sense, the poor may not be "discrete," in that each year some
leave and others join the ranks of those with incomes below the subsis-
tence level. 113 By contrast, blacks and members of other racial minorities
which were disfavored under the racial caste system were more discrete,
for they were generally identifiable and few could escape the identification
even if they preferred to do so. Ironically, this physical attribute that
made them easy targets for discrimination as discrete groups ultimately
helped them to fight for equality. Thus, out of the adversity of the caste
system, blacks forged a sense of solidarity and tools of political organiza-
tion that ultimately led to a degree of success in the political process. That
solidarity and political organization are almost entirely lacking among the
poor; indeed, the shifting membership of the poor reinforces a need for
special protection.
Other factors have progressively weakened the efficacy of low-income
people in the political process and are likely to leave them in an even
more precarious condition in the future. At one time, unskilled people,
immigrants and others, were needed to build the nation's industrial capac-
ity. During the Depression, the ranks of the poor were so large that the
government's failure to redress their grievances would have threatened the
political as well as the economic stability of the country. The success since
World War II in reducing the number of poor people through economic
growth, social legislation addressing the needs of older people, and the
impact of the civil rights revolution, has substantially diminished the po-
tential force of any political movement on behalf of the poor. Perhaps
more important, the needs of the economic system have shifted dramati-
111. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
112. There has been spirited academic debate over whether the Carolene principle is over- or
under-inclusive or should be revised to better state the basis for heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT (1980); Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713
(1985). Almost all commentators agree, however, that there should be some special judicial protection
for those worst-off in our society.
113. See supra note 32.
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cally. Manufacturing has become less central to the American economy,
and with increased reliance on other nations as sources of supply for
cheap labor, unskilled American workers have become economically dis-
posable people.
One other important change is the crucial role of financial contributions
in shaping the results of elections and the outcomes of political issues.
Since the defining characteristic of the poor is lack of money, it must be
acknowledged that they are at a greater disadvantage than ever before in
relying on the political processes for basic protections.
Nor is the character of prejudice against the poor such that the disabili-
ties listed above are likely to be compensated for in other ways. Racism in
the various forms it has taken since the importation of the first slave is
undoubtedly the most malevolent and deeply ingrained "prejudice" that
has affected the American polity. But for that very reason, and because it
so patently contradicted the general professions of equality found in our
charter documents, the issue of race has remained highly visible over the
course of two centuries. Moreover, it could hardly be denied that the gov-
ernment played an integral role in the system of oppression that relegated
blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans to the status of second-
class citizens. That fact, too, ultimately became a persuasive argument for
the responsibility of government to take corrective action. By contrast, al-
though the facts may be more complicated, the general view of the govern-
ment's role in contributing to the plight of poor people is that it has at
most been one of neglect rather than active participation.
Support for civil rights legislation also was bolstered by an ultimate
recognition that race is an immutable characteristic and that it is funda-
mentally unfair to permit a person to be penalized for a condition she is
helpless to change. By contrast, the general public view is that the poor in
most circumstances are responsible for their own condition and, therefore,
that government's obligation to assist them is very limited." 4
All of this is not to say that ultimately altruistic sentiments and a belief
in fairness on the part of most Americans may not lead to more equitable
treatment of poor people. Indeed, unless such a change occurs and is re-
flected in legislative policy, little progress can be expected. It does suggest,
however, that as long as the courts have a role in assuring basic protection
114. Obviously, public attitudes may vary, depending on the perceived causes and whether the
poor are regarded as "deserving" or "undeserving." Those threatened with impoverishment because
they are old have received a more positive response from government than others in part because age,
like race, is understood as an immutable characteristic (and also because their growing numbers have
made them a strong political force). Children might ordinarily be thought to be among the "deserving
poor" since they certainly cannot be held responsible for their own plight. But in their treatment
under welfare programs, they appear to be held hostage to a belief that payments adequate to meet
their needs would encourage welfare dependence by their mothers.
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for those who have the odds stacked heavily against them in the political
system, poor people have a powerful claim for such protection. This con-
clusion may apply with particular force when dealing with practices that
isolate the poor. Experience has shown that the separation of blacks from
whites provided fertile ground for the growth of stereotypes, fears and
mistrust between the races and that only when the wall of isolation began
to crack did the attitudinal barriers to black progress begin to lower. Simi-
larly, the political processes "ordinarily to be relied on" may function in a
more informed and positive fashion once barriers to understanding created
by isolation of the poor are lowered.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the books were to be closed on Brown v. Board of Education today,
the decision would have to be deemed a resounding success. What hap-
pened in the aftermath of the decision demonstrated how deeply en-
trenched and difficult to dislodge our racial caste system had been. But it
also demonstrated that law-including the law declared by federal courts
in interpreting the Constitution-can serve as a means of empowering the
powerless, enabling them to make changes in their own lives which permit
them to develop their potential and participate more fully in the society in
which they live.
Brown has also validated the role of the judiciary as a catalyst in help-
ing to renew and revitalize our political processes. Apart from the success
achieved in its own sphere, the movement for black civil rights has played
an important role in spawning similar legal and political movements that
have asserted the rights of women, Hispanic Americans, the disabled, the
elderly, and other minority groups. Most of us have become more aware
of the unjust limitations that government and society have imposed on
minority citizens, women, the disabled and others and how our own
prejudices and stereotypes have contributed to these barriers. Once
aroused, this consciousness of injustice does not fade easily, even under the
prod of regressive leadership. Thus, the progress that has been made is
not likely to evaporate.
But the gains of the past three decades have occurred against the back-
drop of a society growing increasingly stratified by class and income sta-
tus. For many, the "escape" routes to middle-class status have become far
more difficult to negotiate. Black people, not surprisingly, constitute a dis-
proportionately large segment of those who have become most deeply
mired in poverty.
In the approach that they have taken to civil rights remedies, the courts
have been able to ameliorate the problem to some degree. They have ap-
proached the issues with an understanding that the caste system has had
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severe and continuing impact on the lives of blacks, consequences that are
real and that persist even though they resist precise measurement. Largely
eschewing theoretical debates about "color blindness," the courts have
sought in most cases to provide practical opportunities to black people,
bounded only by the need to recognize the legitimate interests of others.
However, practices and policies that isolate the poor and deny them
access to resources and services needed to change their condition go far
beyond the current reach of civil rights remedies. In approaching
problems of class and wealth discrimination, the courts are faced with
institutional limitations and problems even thornier than those they con-
fronted in dealing with race. But that does not mean that the judiciary is
without authority and responsibility. The judiciary remains the monitor of
the integrity of the political process, the agency for compelling the other
branches of government and the people to face up to issues we prefer to
ignore.
The response of the nation to problems of continuing discrimination
and deprivation no doubt will emerge from the warring instincts of hope
and fear, of generosity and meanness, that reside within each of us, and
the quality of the political leadership that appeals to those instincts. The
role of the judiciary is limited but crucial; if it performs its function, it
may help our better natures to prevail.
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